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Ethics, Economics, Politics, and History of Science in the Works of Adam Smith 
The prevailing image of the work of Adam Smith has far a long time been that of a blend of Deism, 
Natural Law philosophy, and mechanistic science, a deductivist and aprioristic metaphysics of 
society. Das Adam Smith Problem originated within this framework: it was the problem of the 
difficult cohabitation of two different metaphysics of man, one based on the principle of self-love 
and the other based on the opposing principle of benevolence (Raphael and Macfie 1976: 20-25). In 
the 1930s and 1940s a rescue operation took place: Adam Smith's economic work, to begin with, 
and later on his ethical work too, were held to be free from dogmatic metaphysical implications; for 
the puzzling words "nature" and "natural" a graceful translation was found in the words "ordinary' 
and "average" (WN I.vii.3), and his ethical theory was twisted into a value-free sociology of ethical 
behavior (Viner 1927; Bittermann 1940; Campbell 1971; for an overview see Lindgren 1973: 1-3).  
Only after the full "empiricization" of Adam Smith had been carried out, some attention was paid to 
his writings in the area of philosophy of science, and it was suggested that the possible influence of 
his philosophy of science on his economic theory deserved to be explored (Becker 1961; Thompson 
1965; Lindgren 1973: eh. 1). These first attempts were the victims of a high degree of anachronism 
and Smith was dressed up as a follower of Hempel, Popper, or Peter Winch. The rediscovery of 
Smith's epistemological writings was nonetheless laudable. and some other contributions were able 
to place these writings within their appropriate context, that is, within the several trends of 
eighteenth-century Newtonianism (Moscovici 1956; Skinner 1974; Megill 1975),  
The next step was to develop a balanced reconstruction of the relationship between Smith's version 
of Newtonian methodology and his political economy, viewed against the background of the wider 
Humean project of a Newtonian science of human nature (Cremaschi 1981; Cremaschi 1982; 
Hetherington 1983; Cremaschi 1984). The main theses put forth in these contributions are as 
follows: (1) the central feature of the epistemological background of The Wealth of Nations is the 
Newtonian thesis of the 'intermediate' character of the principles of the theory, between the 
phenomena and the principles of reality in itself; (2) political! economy becomes a comparatively 
autonomous discipline, precisely because of this intermediate character of its principles: (3) even if 
its principles are no longer identical with the principles of Natural Law, political economy is still 
inherently part of the wider body of a "moral science" along with ethics and natural jurisprudence: 
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the difference between it and the seventeenth-century attitude lies in the fact that the "science of 
natural law" or "moral science" ceases to be a unitary deductive system. 
The next step was to develop a balanced reconstruction of the relationship between Smith's version 
of Newtonian methodology and his political economy, viewed against the background of the wider 
Humean project of a Newtonian science of human nature (Cremaschi 1981; Cremaschi 1982; 
Hetherington 1983; Cremaschi 1984). The main theses put forth in these contributions are as 
follows: (1) the central feature of the epistemological background of The Wealth of Nations is the 
Newtonian thesis of the 'intermediate' character of the principles of the theory, between the 
phenomena and the principles of reality in itself; (2) political economy becomes a comparatively 
autonomous discipline, precisely because of this intermediate character of its principles: (3) even if 
its principles are no longer identical with the principles of Natural Law, political economy is still 
inherently part of the wider body of a "moral science" along with ethics and natural jurisprudence: 
the difference between it and the seventeenth-century attitude lies in the fact that the "science of 
natural law" or "moral science" ceases to be a unitary deductive system. 
Within the framework of these theses, it may prove useful to re-examine Smith's political economy 
alongside of his political theory, A parallel development in Smith's scholarship during the past 
decade has destroyed the myth of the "liberal" Smith, proponent of a theory of the minimal state 
(Winch 1978: 6 ff.). The discovery of a new set of notes from his Lectures on jurisprudence has 
contributed much to a fuller appreciation of what his projected "history and theory of law and 
government" was meant to be (Meek, Raphael, and Stein 1977: 33-35), and several other important 
contributions have highlighted his place in the "skeptical Whig" tradition, in the "civic humanist" 
tradition, and in the prosecution of Hume's project of a "theory of justice" (Forbes 1954; Pocock 
1975: 468-505; Winch 1978; Haakonssen 1981), As a result we are now able to see the contours of 
a typical Scottish and Smithian doctrine, the part of Smith's system of ideas most similar to a political 
theory in the present sense. This peculiar discipline, named natural jurisprudence, is worlds apart 
from nineteenth-century liberal political theories, but it also has important differences from 
seventeenth-century Natural Law philosophy, As a further result we are also able to appreciate how 
Smith's political economy –  notwithstanding its recent autonomy –  is still embedded in a political 
theory, with all the implied differences from later classical economists. In this chapter I shall try to 
take advantage of this renewed image of Smith's politics as a starting point for an exploration of the 
connection between these doctrines and his epistemology. The connection to be explored will be 
rather intricate: rather than a direct link between an image of science and an image of politics, it is 
a devious path leading from a theory of the principles of the mind to a reconstruction of the history 
of natural science, and a parallel, even more twisted, path leading from the theory of the mind to a 
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general theory of human society and of its evolution, and further on to theories of moral judgments, 
government, moral rules, and of the market.  
In more detail, I will argue that: (1) the epistemological doctrines of Smith are led to a stalemate by 
the opposition between an eventually still shared essentialist ideal of knowledge and a pragmatist 
and instrumentalist approach to the history of science; (2) the political doctrines of Smith are still 
intended to serve the goal of providing a foundation to a Natural Law; (3) a weaker foundation is 
found in 'nature' rather than in 'reason' in order to avoid the paradoxes of rationalistic Natural Law 
theories: (4) as a consequence, the legitimation of several partial social orders is introduced, which 
may be the objects of inquiry of several specialized social sciences; (5) as a parallel consequence, 
we are led into a stalemate, similar to the one faced by Smith's epistemology, by the need to bring 
about an impossible reconciliation between the ultimate order of society and the several partial 
empirical orders.  
 
 
Descartes and Newton  
 
I shall begin with a brief reconstruction of the content of Smith's writings on the history of science, 
His masterpiece in this field, "The History of Astronomy,"1 starts with a section illustrating the 
"principles" of the mind that lead to the construction of "philosophical systems." This opening 
section is followed by a reconstruction of the history of the astronomical systems, which followed 
each other, starting from ancient times and concluding with Descartes's theory of vortexes and 
Newton's theory of universal gravitation. The essay is unfinished, and it is worth noting that it stops 
at the open question of the real significance of the Newtonian system (HA IV.76). The need to 
formulate philosophical systems and later on to substitute one system for another, sterns from a 
few basic laws of the mind. The mind perceives a kind of gap every time it faces a phenomenon 
different from the one it was used to finding in a given sequence. Wonder, an uneasy feeling, 
originates in the mind as a result. The imagination tries to provide a remedy for this uneasy feeling 
by creating an imaginary chain to link the disconnected phenomena. The renewed perception of 
some kind of continuity between phenomena restores the imagination to a condition of ease (HA 
II.8-12).  
It is important to note that the view of the principles of the mind or of human nature sketched in 
"The History of Astronomy" and presented in more detail in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 
                                                             
1 "The History of Astronomy" was never published during the author’s lifetime. The essay is a part of a wider collection 
along with two shorter and possibly less elaborated essays on "The History of Ancient Physics" and "The History of 
Ancient Logics and Metaphysics," under the general heading: "The Principles which lead and direct Philosophical 
Enquiries." 
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I.i.1.3-8; ED 19; 88; TMS III.3.3; HA I-III) is basically identical with the "science of human nature" dealt 
with in Hume's Treatise (THN Introduction; II.i.5; II.iii.9; IIl.i.2). Its basic features are atomism, 
association of ideas, "imagination" understood as the principle that combines different ideas, 
custom, and sympathy. The role of sympathy, as shown later, is primary in social interaction, 
whereas when man is faced with nature, it is imagination that plays a prime role (Cremaschi 1984: 
34-42; 87-89; Raphael and Skinner 1980: 17-21).  
Smith states that theories are like "imaginary machines," or chains of ideas built by the imagination 
between two disjoined phenomena, The imaginary machine is supposed to link the observed 
phenomena while remaining out of sight behind the scenes of nature, like theatrical machinery, The 
best imaginary machines are chosen according to the criteria of 'simplicity' and 'familiarity: of the 
principles employed, of the 'coherence' produced in the domain of phenomena explained, and of 
the comprehensiveness of the domain the theory unifies. The succession of systems is ruled by these 
four criteria: a system is accepted as a substitute for the preceding one when it is able to connect 
phenomena that the preceding one could not connect, or when it is able to build the chain by means 
of more familiar principles, or when it is able to unify to a greater extent the given domain of 
phenomena. According to these criteria, the succession of the Copernican system to the Ptolemaic 
system is explained: the latter had grown so complicated while endeavoring to account for new 
phenomena that it had become useless to the imagination as a guide for understanding reality. The 
Copernican system was then accepted as a substitute because it explained the same phenomena in 
a much simpler way (HA IV.27-32).  
The most interesting part of the essay is to be found in the last pages, dealing with Descartes and 
Newton: Descartes's theory of vortexes and Newton's theory of universal gravitation are two 
different attempts to complete the Copernican system, making it more comprehensive and more 
familiar by providing a cause for the motions of the planets. The Cartesian system of vortexes had 
the great merit of being able to render the rapid motions of the enormous bodies of the planets 
familiar to the imagination, although the idea contrasts with the habits acquired by the imagination. 
The very familiar idea of impulse was used to reach this result. The main difficulty in the Cartesian 
system derived from the fact that it accounted only for the fundamental motions of the heavenly 
bodies and could not explain irregularities in their motions. Far from accommodating his system to 
all the minute irregularities which Kepler had ascertained in the motions of the planets, Descartes 
"contented himself with observing that perfect uniformity could not be expected in their motions" 
(HA IV.66). In this way he thought he could avoid the need to take the astronomers' empirical 
observations into account. This Cartesian systems inability to explain observed phenomena paved 
the way for the Newtonian system. Newton "first attempted to give a physical account of the 
motions of the Planets, which should accommodate itself to all the constant irregularities which 
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astronomers had ever observed in their motions" (HA IV.67). The advantage of the Newtonian 
system lies in the introduction of a now familiar notion, the idea of gravitation, as a hypothesis to 
explain the motions of the heavenly bodies. This single hypothesis accounts for all the phenomena, 
terrestrial and heavenly. The same hypothesis also covers observed irregularities in the heavenly 
motions. As a result, the Newtonian system complied more closely with the requirements of the 
imagination, so that Smith himself states that he has "insensibly been drawn in, to make use of 
language expressing the connecting principles of this one, as if they were the real chains which 
Nature makes use of to bind together her several operations" (HA IV.76). The imagination, by 
replacing one theory by another that complies better with its requirements, feels as if it had 
penetrated deeper into reality, Yet, in fact, every theory, the Newtonian included, is an "invention 
of the imagination." What we can properly say is that a theory serves the purpose, in a better or 
worse way, of establishing a direction amid the chaos of phenomena. There are, however, no 
grounds for stating that a theory that satisfies the four criteria better is a better reproduction of the 
essence of reality. The manuscript of "The History of Astronomy" stops in the midst of the discussion 
of the Newtonian system. An editorial note warns us that, according to the notes left by Adam Smith, 
the part on Newton was to be considered "imperfect, and needing several additions" (HA IV.76). We 
are entitled, from a statement by Smith himself, to assume that he did not publish the essay 
precisely because he considered it imperfect, but not primarily on stylistic grounds (Corr: Letter 
137). Conceivably the source of Smith's dissatisfaction was the contrast between the need felt by 
the imagination to believe in the real existence of principles connecting phenomena, on the one 
hand, and the compulsory conclusion reached on rational reflection, that it is impossible to know 
what "real chains" Nature uses to bind phenomena and that the explanatory principles have a 
conventional character, on the other hand (Moscovici 1956: 10; Cremaschi 1981; Hetherington 
1983; Cremaschi 1984: ch. 1). To sum up: Smith acknowledges that we are under the pull of two 
opposite views of science. The first is based on the idea of an internal criterion of truth (that can be 
used, but is at the same time "irrational," depending only on our imagination's needs): the second 
view is based on a "correspondence" or-rather-a "copy" theory of truth (one that cannot be given 
up if science is not mete fancy, myth, or artistic creation, but at the same time one that cannot be 
used in practice).   
 
 
Grotius and Montesquieu  
Adam Smith's Politics: An Overview  
Smith was not able during his lifetime to fulfil the promise he had made to publish a "theory and 
history of law and government" or "an account of the general principles of law and government" 
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(TMS VII.iv.37). We know however that in the l1at years of his life he had not "altogether abandoned 
the design" (TMS Advertisement 2). We cannot know exactly how relevant to this project were the 
papers that Smith, when he was on his death bed, ordered burned. Nonetheless we are sure he 
considered The Wealth of Nations as a partial execution of this project (TMS Advertisement 2). The 
discovery of the notes from the Lectures an jurisprudence enables us to compare the partial 
execution with what can be taken as the general scheme of the wider project: The Wealth of Nations 
covers the second part of the lectures, dedicated to "justice." Our understanding of the original 
content of the lectures has been greatly improved by the discovery of a second set of lecture notes, 
less complete in coverage than the one edited by E. Cannan, but more accurate, and of another 
fragment of notes2. 
The whole of Smith's work is, however, a complex. like a set of Russian dolls. As The Wealth of 
Nations is embedded in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, so the Lectures are embedded in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. Section 2 of the latter work covers the area that the Lectures on jurisprudence 
explore in a much more analytical way. As the corresponding part of the Lectures is less analytical 
than the treatment of the same topics in The Wealth of Nations, but gives more hints about the 
ultimate foundation in the science of human nature of the principles put to work in the theory, so 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments goes one step further toward. that central area of Smith's system 
of ideas-the science of human nature-s-to which no single work was dedicated, As I shall argue later, 
the theory of human nature is a point on which both lines of Smith's work, the social theory and the 
theory of language, art, and science, converge.  
Faced with a set of works embedded in each other, in order to reconstruct the contours of Adam 
Smith's "politics," it may prove useful to inspect carefully the joints connecting the parts. Smith has 
been held for a long time to be the proponent of a "minimal state" view, one emptying the domain 
of political in favor of the bordering domain of economics (see Cropsey 1963; for the opposite view 
see Winch 1978: 6 ff.). The traditional view is clearly based on an anachronism: the configuration in 
Smith of the overall social domain, with its ethical, political, and economic subdomains, is very 
different from the eighteenth-century view, being much nearer to a liberalized or "decentralized" 
version of the seventeenth-century view of the "practical science," which covered ethics, law, and 
politics (Cremaschi 1982).  
A preliminary terminological clarification is required: Smith describes his doctrines by the terms 
"natural jurisprudence." "science of a legislator," "political economy," "justice," and "police." 
"Natura! jurisprudence" is the general term that indicates Smith's political doctrines. It is a part of 
moral philosophy, as explicitly stated in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, where natural 
                                                             
2 See Meek, Raphael, and Stein 1977: 32-35. The two main sets of notes are published together in Lectures on 
jurisprudence. 
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jurisprudence is said to be "of all the sciences by far the most important, but hitherto, perhaps, the 
least cultivated" (TMS VI.ii Introduction 2). It is "the theory of the rules by which civil governments 
ought to be directed" (LJ(A) i.1), or the theory of "the general principles which ought to be the 
foundation of the laws of all nations" (LJ(B) 1; see also TMS VII.iv.37).  
Natural jurisprudence is identical! with "the science of a legislator" (TMS VI.ii, Introduction 1), that 
is, a figure opposed to that of the "politician": the legislator is a wise and prudent man inspired by 
a desire to ameliorate the conditions of his country and is directed by prudence and by well- founded 
principles (TMS VI.ii.2.16-18). Smith talks of the "science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought 
to be governed by general principles which are always the same" (WN IV.ii.39). Natural 
jurisprudence is divided into two parts: the first, or the theory of "justice," concerns rights of the 
individual. It is not a deductive legal theory but a theory of the "originall or foundation" of rights, 
and it performs this task by an explication, like the one given by grammar for language, of that 
"natural justice" dictated to us by our "natural sentiments" (TMS III.6.11; LJ (A) 1.24). In this sense 
natural justice is included in the theory of moral sentiments, and yet it is distinguished from a 
"system of moralls" (LJ(A) L15).  
The second part is the doctrine of "police,' which concerns the "inferior parts" of the science of a 
legislator. Its main object is "cheapness or plenty." It differs markedly from the first part of natural 
jurisprudence, being based not only on considerations of justice but also on considerations of 
"expediency." "Political economy" is identical with the second part of natural jurisprudence, or with 
"police," and it may accordingly be "considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or 
legislator" (WN IV.a.1).  
The best-starting point for a reconstruction of the complex system of ethical-political-economic 
doctrines, as well as of Smiths political theory in a strict sense, is the pars destruens of his 
undertaking, His main critical targets are utilitarianism in ethics and artificialism in politics. The views 
he wants to criticize are primarily those of Hobbes and Locke, and secondly those of the "rationalist" 
Natural Law philosophers Grotius and Pufendorf and of the "moral sense" Natural Law philosopher 
Hutcheson. He wants to take over Hume's attempt at finding an alternative "foundation' to Natural 
Law, other than reason or moral sense, but he adds to Hume’s solution a powerful dose of 
Montesquieu's genetic account of law and of the Scottish evolutionary theory of society.  
Hume's attempt had been to avoid recognition of any supernatural origin of a natural law or of its 
origin in any explicit deliberation by human beings, while avoiding complete relativism, He had tried 
to reconstruct the genesis of a set of general rules of justice as a result of pure1y "natural" causes, 
i.e., individual human actions, though not as an intended result of such actions (THN IlI.ii.6.5-6). So 
justice is seen to originate as an unforeseeable result of numberless individual judgments as human 
beings are "powerfully addicted to general rules" (THN III.ii.9.3), and the rules of justice play the role 
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of the traditional idea of a Natural Law: "tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. 
Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature" (THN IIl.ii.1.19). 
The difficulty that Smith may have felt with Hume's approach, even if he was highly sympathetic 
with Hume's project, stems from the dichotomy between an abstract system of general rules and 
the individual judgments governed by sympathy, The lack of concrete content of the rules of justice 
seems to make Hume fall back from time to time into a rationalistic view of how the sympathy 
mechanisms work (Haakonssen 1981: 36).  
In Hume's account a third category between "natural" and "artificial" seems to be required 
(Haakonssen: 21-26). That is why Hume's "theory of justice" is integrated by Smith with an 
evolutionary theory of the genesis of government and of law that follows the inspiration of 
Montesquieu’s attempt at discovering the "spirit of laws" and that tries to provide precisely that 
third intermediate element. Smith's attempt is based on a much more sophisticated theory than 
Montesquieu's "climatic factors theory." that is, on the four-stage theory that makes the forms of 
government dependent upon the modes of subsistence (LJ(A) iv.4-55; LJ(B) 19-30). In contrast with 
Hume's approach, Smith should be able to accomplish the following: to show how, through a 
continuous process of adaptation, our sympathetic moral judgments continuously select, vis-à-vis 
changing situations, basic standards of evaluation (applying both lo rules of "justice" and to other 
virtues) that tend to approximate an ideal standard. These standards can in a sense transcend given 
customs and laws (TMS VII.iv.36), and they are approximately convergent with this ideal standard 
because the laws of the functioning and of the evolution of human societies make virtue, and 
particularly justice, a precondition for the survival of society (TMS IL2.4; II.5.S; VII.iii.l.2; VII.ii.2.13).  
The evolution of custom and of moral codes and, most interesting for the present discussion, the 
institutions of government and systems of law are dependent upon social evolution plus 
sympathetic judgments. Government did not originate from an original contract, nor was it created 
in some "state of nature," "as there is no such state existing" (LJ(B) 3; LJ(A) v.114-119; 127-129).  
There has been indeed a state of society, the "age of hunters" or "the rude and early state," where 
society existed with "very little government of any sort” (LJ(A) iv.4). Government arose "naturally" 
as, in the subsequent ages of history, society grew more and more complex: its sources were the 
authority spontaneously accorded to older, wiser, more valiant people, the need to protect the 
property of the rich against the poor, and the direct influence over other people carried by wealth 
in pre-commercial societies (LJ(A) iv.7-12; iv.22-23).  
The origin of law is more recent than the origin of government. The first forms of government, in 
the age of the shepherds. included only the executive power; later, in the more complex agricultural 
societies, a judicial power was required. Only after the institution of a judicial power did a body of 
laws gradually come into being (LJ(A) v.122).  
91 
 
The general framework that has been sketched depends on two elements: the ways in which 
societies function and evolve, and the ways in which sympathetic "natural sentiments" are 
regulated. l shall present first the background social theory presupposed by Smith. In this theory 
two dimensions can be distinguished: the first may be qualified as a kind of "proto-functionalism."3 
Society is often presented in functionalist terms, stressing the interdependence of the several social 
domains and the ability of societies to self-regulate and self-correct their internal processes. In these 
terms, a "contextual" explanation of the several elements of any given society is available. Such an 
approach comes to the fore every time Smith adopts the Stoic or Deistic attitude that has been 
qualified as "contemplative utilitarianism" (Campbell 1977: 528). The importance of the 
contemplative utilitarian attitude in Smith's system of ideas can hardly be over-estimated, though 
there is abundant evidence refuting Campbell's view, according to which contemplative 
utilitarianism is the only alternative Smith is supposed to adopt to a value-free descriptive attitude 
(Campbell 1971: 51). I shall argue later that the possibility of a third way between the two attitudes 
is essential to Smith. 
According to the proto-functionalist vision, all aspects of human reality –  the unintended results of 
individual actions, the spontaneous self-correction of our natural sentiments, the operation of the 
mechanisms of political and legal institutions, and a number of other human institutions such as 
language and exchange –  interact with each other and readjust themselves in a continuous selection 
of appropriate behaviors (TMS I.i.3.6; I.i.4.7; V.2.l0; LJ(B) 326-327; LJ(A) iv.4-55; Languages; LJ(A) 
vi.44-55; Haakonssen 1981: 54-61). Smith makes the assumption that the interacting elements of 
the social system cooperate in the long run and in a rough way leading to the prosperity of mankind: 
"No society could subsist a moment, in which the usual strain of men's conduct and behaviour was 
of a piece with the horrible practice l have just now mentioned" (TMS V.2.16; see also TMS II.3.5-6; 
IIII.2.6-7).  
As an obvious consequence of the unintended character of this continuous process of readjustment, 
the extent to which conscious human action can influence what happens is limited, On the one 
hand, human beings can become aware of the utility of virtue: virtue contributes to the smoother 
functioning of the social machine by adding "beneficence" to "justice." The latter, being 
indispensable to the survival of society, is primarily recommended by our natural sentiments, while 
                                                             
3 Obviously enough, I am referring to the sociological notion of functionalism, According to its founding father, 
Malinowski, it is "explanation of ... facts ... by the part they play within the integral system of culture, by the manner in 
which they are related to each other within the system, and by the manner in which this system is related to the 
physical surroundings" (quoted by Emmet 1967). The classification of Smiths background soda! theory as 
"functionalist" has been made in Campbell (1977: 528). The qualifier "proto," which I have added, is meant to convey 
the idea that Smiths background soda! theory, while very far from being a methodologically self-aware statement of 
such a view, is however a first step in this direction, providing an overall picture of the social system as a multi-level! 
system of interactions,4. Such a reactionary move has already been made by Robertson (see Robertson 1983: 482). To 
my taste he goes a little too far in this direction. 
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beneficence, being less indipensable, is suggested to us by "reason and philosophy" (TMS lLii.6.1O; 
VUi.1,1-2). On the other hand, conscious human intervention can achieve cautious reforms of 
artificial human institutions, such as would not hinder but rather ease the attainment of those goals 
that Nature would in the long run more or less unfailingly reach (TMS VLii.2.16-17). But the role of 
the "man of government" will be discussed in detail later. 
The second dimension of the background social theory is evolutionary, This dimension comes to the 
fore in the well-known four-stage theory (Meek 1976; Skinner 1982), according to which the forms 
of government are determined by the "mode of subsistence" of a given society: hunting, stock 
raising, agriculture, commerce. The political institutions evolve through the several stages thanks to 
the unintended results of human action. Mankind’s natural sentiments, which give origin to the 
standards of justice accepted in a particular society, evolve according to what it is reasonable to 
expect from fellow human beings in the circumstances (TMS V.2.7-9). 
The primary spring of evolution is a kind of Vicoesque "heterogenesis of ends," or the principle of 
unintended results, according to which events originate from human action even if not from human 
design (Forbes 1954: 661; Forbes 1977a; Cremaschi 1982: 242-243). Not only can a "natural" 
functioning of the social whole be acknowledged at any given moment, but also a "natural course 
of things," i.e., a path of evolution that is roughly unavoidable and that is –  or has been up to the 
present time –  a way toward happiness and perfection of mankind (even though a rather transverse 
way to that end, as the discussion that follows will show).  
What helps make this quasi-optimistic vision flexible enough to escape from apriorism is the 
supplementary idea of the "animal principle": nature will find its own way through the obstacles 
created by imperfect human institutions and will not wait until they have been removed or perfect 
human institutions have been established (WN IV.ix.28; II.iii.31).  
Both the functionalist dimension and the evolutionary dimension of the theory of society rely, as an 
ultimate basis, on the very same Humean theory of human nature on which Smith's theory of natural 
science was based. On the basis of the laws of the mind it is possible to account for phenomena 
such as the evolution of language, the desire for goods that go beyond the basic necessities also 
common to animals, the desire to better our condition, the distinction of ranks, the propensity to 
"truck and barter," the desire to be considered praiseworthy, and finally respect for every institution 
that is established and old (Languages 41; LJ(A) vi.13; TMS I.iii.2.1; LJ(A) vi.44-157; LJ(A) vi.45; TMS 
V.1). While imagination plays a primary role in organizing our perception of natural phenomena, 
and also plays an important role in social life, the more complex mechanism of sympathy 
(nevertheless rooted in imagination, being based on the ability to make an imaginary switch of 
situation) rules over social interaction. That may explain why the construction of systems in natural 
philosophy has been a necessity felt from the very beginning by the mind, in order to overcome 
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apparent disorder (HA IV.8-12; WN V.i.f.25), while disorder in social life has always been felt on a 
small scale and has been tackled through sympathetic readjustments of moral sentiments.  
Systems in moral philosophy come only at a later stage (TM5 VII.ii.4.14; WN V.i.f.25; Haakonssen 
1981: 79-82). A proviso should be made: as natural philosophy is ultimately dependent on the 
principles of the mind, but this dependence is limited by the unbridgeable gap between the 
principles of the mind and the real principles of nature, so the dependence of "moral philosophy" 
on the principles of the mind is limited by the gap between the conscious aims of human beings and 
the unintended results they unconsciously produce.  
Mention has been made of the fact that natural jurisprudence consists of two parts: "justice" and 
"police." The part on justice can be viewed as directly belonging to the theory of moral sentiments; 
it is the part of the theory ·of moral sentiments that deals with a virtue more necessary than any 
other to the existence of society that can be treated in a much more exact way. Justice is sharply 
contrasted with benevolence: the former may subsist between rational egoists (TMS lI.ii.3.2). At the 
root of justice lies resentment (TMS II.ii.1.4), which may in several instances be the principle 
regulating the proper use of violence (TMS II.ii.1.8-9). "Natural justice" is accordingly a standard not 
derived from reason but dictated by natural sentiments. Its basic character for social life is 
dependent on the importance of negative, as contrasted with positive, virtues, Pain and misery are 
felt more pungently than pleasure and happiness: sympathy with these negative feelings is 
accordingly much stronger (TMS I.iii; III.2.15). The role of resentment in founding the sense of justice 
is derived from this characteristic of sympathy (LJ(A) ii.89-90; TMS II.ii.1-9). The whole doctrine of 
justice is accordingly an explication and systematization of criteria dictated by our "natural 
sentiments." The criteria of justice are not derived from reason in any of the possible senses: neither 
by deduction from a cosmic lex aeterna, nor by contractualistic fiction, nor by utilitarian 
considerations.  
Utilitarian considerations of a sort are admissible more for speculative than for practical purposes, 
and are the business of philosophers, not of men of action, or they may be appealed to in some 
cases for rhetorical or didactic purposes, as a partial remedy for the tearing of the natural sense of 
justice. Human beings may approve of a certain institution also because of its utility in view of the 
happiness and perfection of human life, but only post factum, once the institution has been 
accepted and approved by the passions and sentiments of men (LJ(A) v.119-122; Campbell 1977: 
528- 529; Haakonssen 1981: 73). "Natural justice," as a consequence, is clearly for Smith a form of 
Natural Law, that is, a theory of "the general principles which ought to run through and be the 
foundation of the laws of all nations" (TMS VII.iv.37). The normative function of natural 
jurisprudence is beyond any doubt; its difference from seventeenth-century Natural Law lies rather 
in its non-rationalistic foundation, Smith rules out an original law of nature as a fixed legal code that 
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could be deduced by reason or learned by experience. In different societies positive laws are judged 
against the standard provided by "natural justice" or by the "natural sentiments" of mankind, These 
sentiments, regulated by sympathy and by the impartial spectator, are not completely universal and 
metahistorical (LJ(A) i.24; ii.75; ii.162; i.36; HA3; TMS l.i.1). This is a central feature that cannot be 
given up in the economy of Smith's system, But the troubles it causes to the system have been often 
under- estimated (as by Haakonssen 1981: 1of-102). The variability of natural sentiments is 
necessary to avoid an aprioristic and ahistorical approach; they recognize human actions as 
appropriate in different ways according to the historical context, but they may be "corrupted" by 
fashion and by a few innate tendencies of human imagination (TMS V.ii). While the normative 
content of Smith's theory of justice can be ascribed, in terms of history of the climates of opinion, 
to the "skeptical Whig" and to the "civic humanist" traditions, it fits nonetheless significantly into 
the theoretical framework provided by Smiths peculiar version of Natural Law. The basic value for 
Smith seems to be "personal liberty":  
 
The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from over-rating the difference between 
one permanent situation and another, Avarice over-rates the differences between poverty and riches. Except the 
frivolous pleasures of vanity and superiority, we may find, in the most humble station, where there is only personal 
liberty every other which the most exalted can afford. (TMS llL3.31).  
 
The predominance of "personal liberty" seems to be related to a Stoical underrating of the 
possibilities of human happiness; the real differences between the happiness that can be afforded 
by the different "stations" in life is greatly emphasized by the imagination. The condition of the 
beggar and that of the king are not greatly different (TMS IV1.10; I.iii.2.2). The primary object of the 
"science of a legislator" is accordingly not so much happiness, but rather "justice" or "rights." 
Security is a precondition for making justice possible. If, on the one hand, the promotion of 
happiness cannot be the real task of a legislator, on the other, the primary aim of personal freedom 
must not be mistaken for the different target of "political freedom."  
This last term refers to the participation of citizens in the government of the commonwealth. Smith 
holds "political freedom" to be highly desirable, but he stresses that personal freedom may be 
independent of it: "civilized monarchies," where law and order rule, can afford a high degree of 
personal freedom (WN V.iii.a.15-16; III.iv.4). Conversely, the two kinds of freedom may be in 
conflict, as the case of slavery shows; the lot of a slave is generally better under despotic 
governments, where the sovereign can interfere with the affairs of the slave owners, than under 
republican governments, where the holders of political power are the very same citizens who own 
slaves (Forbes 1977a; Winch 1978: ch.2).  
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The decisive factor in giving priority to the more limited aim of "personal liberty" over the more 
ambitious aim of "political liberty," and in declaring the most ambitious aim of "public happiness" 
almost totally delusory, is the primacy of negative virtues as foundations of rights and justice, as 
stated earlier. From this priority, the typically liberal distinction is between the public sphere, the 
proper object of political and legal regulations, and the sphere of the conscience, which must be 
safeguarded against interference from public authority (TMS II.iii.3.2). Some positive tasks are 
unavoidable for the "civil magistrate": "he may prescribe rules... which not only prohibit mutual 
injuries among fellow-citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree" (TMS II.ii.1.8). 
But in prescribing these very rules he must be as careful as possible not to infringe upon the liberty 
of individuals (TMS II.ii.1.8).  
Even though Smith adheres to "republicanism" on principle (Forbes 1977a; Winch 1978: ch.2), the 
extent to which he commits himself to the practicability of republican principles is limited by the 
negative sympathetic foundation of rights and justice. He contrasts the "Whig" principle of "utility" 
as a foundation of government with the "Tory" principle of "authority," making the prevalence of 
one principle dependent on historical circumstances of a given society (LJ(A) v.119-124; v. 129-132). 
It is impossible to base the legitimacy of governments solely on utility, Le" on the teachings of 
"Reason and Philosophy" (TMS I.iii.2.3) because of the sentimentalist foundation of moral 
judgments, including judgments on justice, In the same line of argument is the refusal of utopias 
(WN V.iii.68; IV.ii.43), the refusal of attempts to achieve perfect systems of social reform by 
"imperial and royal reformers" (TMS VI.ii.12-18), and the refusal of seeing perfect happiness as a 
feasible aim of government (TMS VI.ii.2.17). "Republicanism" in principle –  apart from questions 
about the evolution of Smith's ideas, which will be dealt with later –  is some kind of ultimate 
standard that is however considered to be of limited use in practice.  
 
What institution of government could tend so much to promote the happiness of mankind as the general prevalence of 
wisdom and virtue? All government is but an imperfect remedy for the deficiency of these (TMS IV.ii.1).  
 
The problems of politics are to be stated primarily in terms of constitution al machinery precisely 
because there are too few reasons to lay one's bet on mora! Progress. The scope of Smith's 
pessimism is a central point, requiring careful examination. 
Coming to Smith's diagnosis of the historical moment, his main concern can be acknowledged to be 
the relation between progress of civilization and progress of liberty. His diagnosis is that the course 
of European history has led to a highly contingent and precarious correspondence between progress 
of "opulence" and progress of "liberty" both in "republican" governments (such as England) and in 
"civilized monarchies" (such as France) (WN III.iii.9: III.iv.4; II.i.3; III.iii.5; Forbes 1977a; Winch 1978: 
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ch.4). The last point that needs mention in this overview is the nature and scope of political action 
and discourse. The science of a legislator is wider in scope than just "justice": it includes political 
economy and other parts based on the principle of "expediency," sue h as "security," Yet the only 
normative basis for the science of a legislator lies in "natural justice" (Haakonssen 1981: 96-97). As 
both Utopianism and a Rousseauvian kind of democracy are discarded, the remainder of the science 
of CI legislator can only be based on a prudent calculus (where "prudence" is understood in much 
poorer terms than in the Aristotelian tradition). 
The action of the "man of government" (not of the individual citizen. who is left, after all, to his 
everyday business, regulated by self-interest and natural justice) may be directed mainly at 
smoothing the natural course of things; not even the plain and evident "system of natural liberty," 
dictated in political economy by the natural sense of justice and confirmed by utilitarian 
considerations, should be applied without some Imitation (WN IV.ii.43). Apart from leaving the 
spontaneous market mechanisms reasonably free in their domain, the man of government can 
imitate the results of market mechanisms in other domains such as defense, justice, and education 
(WN V; Robertson 1983: 70). Last of all, the man of government should be aware of the unexpected 
counter-effects a highly artificial intervention may provoke, and needs to act carefully, to take into 
account existing conditions, rooted traditions and institutions, and even to come to terms with 
prejudice when he cannot overcome it, thus avoiding the loss of the second best while trying too 
hard to obtain the best (TMS Vl.ii.2.16). 
 
 
The Epicenters of Society  
The peculiar theoretical framework outlined gives two main results in Smith's work. The first is a 
decentralization of the political order that gives origin to several partial orders: the first specialized 
social science, namely political economy, wins autonomy from the political discourse, The second 
result is a weakening of the normative strength of the order: the several partially autonomous 
orders all have a "weak" kind of normativity. 
Let us start with the first of these results. Smith owes much of his fame to the discovery of the 
principle of unintended results. Ironically, his main theoretical achievement might be described as 
a highly unintended result: Smith started with the intention of radically reforming the "science of 
natural law," and ended as the founder of a "new science." Recent contributions in the history of 
ideas have revised the standard image of Smith as the turning point of the deflection of classical 
political philosophy into economic science (for this image see Cropsey 1963), and have tried to 
restore a balanced relationship between natural jurisprudence and political economy (Winch 1978: 
6 ff.). However, as long as the main results of this restoration are not questioned, namely, that 
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political economy for Smith is inherently a part of natural jurisprudence, and that Book V of The 
Wealth of Nations is not a mere addendum to that work, a few words may be said against the 
currently fashionable image of Smith as a contemporary of Machiavelli and a very remote ancestor 
of Ricardo.! Smith is acknowledged as having realized that the characteristics of modern society 
need to be dealt with on several levels (Dippel 1981: 99-100). I stress that it would be extremely 
naive to describe this achievement in terms of a discovery of the effects of social differentiation in 
progress; Smith describes and makes sense of a number of aspects of complex modern society 
precisely because he is in a position to make a theoretical move toward a subdivision-reaggregation 
of the social whole, resulting in a description of a cluster of phenomena as a new unified domain: 
the national economy. Not arbitrarily, Smith's achievement in The Wealth of Nations can be 
compared with the ancient proponents of the system of epicenters as reconstructed in "The History 
of Astronomy": 
 
by supposing, that in the solidity of the Sphere of each of the Five Planets there was formed another little Sphere, called 
an Epicycle … in the same manner as we might suppose a little wheel enclosed within the outer circle of a great wheel 
... Those philosophers transported themselves, in fancy, to the centres of these imaginary Circles, and took pleasure in 
surveying from thence, all those fantastical motions, arranged, according to that harmony and order, which it had been 
the end of all their researches to bestow upon them. (HA IV.I0-l3) 
 
The author of "The History of Astronomy" may have finally come to terms with the apparent 
disorder of social lite that the highly unified order of the rationalistic Natural Law was not able to 
reduce lo order, by supposing a little wheel. that is the order of the market, enclosed within the 
outer circle of the great wheel of social order. 
The theory presented in The Wealth of Nations relates to a domain whose borders are not identical 
with those of the domains to which it is the heir, It includes a value theory like the Lockean theory 
of property, a theory of equilibrium mechanisms like the Mercantilist theories of foreign trade, a 
theory of a natural order of production, a theory of circulation, and a theory of productive and 
unproductive labor like the Physiocrats' theory of the ordre naturel des sociétés. Most interesting, 
it includes a theory of gravitation like that of Newton's natural philosophy. The difference with the 
previous cases is that the domain of phenomena to which the theoretical mechanism applies is 
altogether different (Jensen 1976; Worland 1976; Lowry 1974; Cremaschi 1981).  
A thesis that I have discussed extensively in earlier works is that the case of the transfer of one 
theoretical entity from natural to moral philosophy is not radically different in its nature from cases 
where the transfer is from a more limited (and partially not overlapping) domain to a newly defined 
domain (Cremaschi 1981; Cremaschi 1984: ch.4). Smith's theoretical revolution thus produces the 
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new notion of "national economy," a notion that includes more than any of the definitions of the 
domains of ancestor-discourses (the right to property and the just price, commerce, the natural 
physical and moral order of societies): at the same time it includes less than any of these definitions, 
as it discards characteristics that turn out to be irrelevant, and severs or loosens links with other 
parts of the social whole (Cremaschi 1986).  
A second, parallel feature of Smith's revolution is the shift in the understanding of the "laws" 
included in the theory. This can be described as a shift from a deductively normative concept of laws 
to a quasi-empirical and weakly normative concept of laws, It is this shift that gives to Smith's theory-
as contrasted with the Physiocrats' discovery of a natural and essential order of societies-e-the 
character of a scientific Galilean theory. On the other hand, these are not the purely descriptive laws 
of the logical empiricist reading of Smith (e.g., Bittermann 1940). A central feature of the Classica l 
paradigm, up to the time of the Marginalist revolution, will be the immediately applied and 
normative consequences of its pure scientific laws (Cremaschi 1986). 
The most powerful enabling factor behind this twofold revolution is the "Galilean break" made by 
Smith: he understands moral philosophy, in the spirit of Hume’s "Moral Newtonianism,' as a 
theoretical enterprise aimed not at establishing definitions of essences, but rather at introducing 
non- ultimate hypotheses to "save the phenomena" (THN I Introduction: Cremaschi 1981; 
Cremaschi 1984: ch.3). It is the Galilean break that makes it possible to conceive of several coexisting 
partial orders (versus the unitary order of rationalistic Natural Law), and it is this break that allows 
for an understanding of these several orders as weakly normative. 
It is pointless lo recall how such an attitude enabled Smith's political economy to gain much more 
empirical content than its ancestor-discourses. It is important instead to suggest that this Galilean 
break was directly influenced by, or at least very similar to, the image of Newtonian natural science 
offered by "The History of Astronomy." The central feature of the Newtonian epistemology, Le" the 
separation of the ultimate principles of reality from the intermediate principles of the theory, lies 
at the core of Smith's revolution in political economy, This central feature was actually a sore point, 
but in political economy it was also the pivotal point around which a powerful new theoretical 
system revolved. 
 
 
Natural Justice, Prejudice, and corruption  
The Galilean break – with all its unresolved epistemological dilemmas – proved highly productive in 
the construction of the first specialized social science. This break was at the core of Smith's attempt 
at formulating a weaker system of Natural Law. In this attempt the dilemmas of the Galilean break 
come more urgently to the fore and can be held eventually responsible for Smith's political 
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disenchantment, for a hopelessly pessimistic diagnosis of the development of civilization, for a 
discouraging appreciation of the limits of political l action and –  most important –  for the admission 
of an unbreakable circular connection between "natural sentiments" and the "natural course of 
things" that leaves no appeal against evil in history and that leads to a reluctant but resigned 
surrender to prejudice, oppression, and injustice.  
A few words are in order about the development of Smith's attitude. An established result of Smith's 
scholarship is the acknowledgment of a progressive shift of the hub of Smith's "skeptical Whiggism" 
from the "Whig" term to the "skeptical" term (Mizuta 1975; Forbes 1977a: 181-182). Thus, the 
young lecturer who incidentally still talks of "natural reason" (LJ(A) LI; ii.29; i.24; i.54; i.26; ii.32) as 
a basis for valuation raises his voice much louder against "so much oppressive inequality" (ED 5) of 
commercial society than the old writer of the additions to the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. Along the same line, confidence in the goodness of "natural sentiments" vanished as 
the first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments was replaced by subsequent editions (TMS 
III.2.30 ff.: I.iii.3; Mizuta 1975: 127-129). It was not merely a matter of individual psychology but 
rather of the general climate of ideas. But the direction of Smith's evolution, even if viewed against 
the background of the course of development of this climate of ideas, still appears as some sort of 
compelled outcome of some basic aporias of his system of ideas. It is on these aporias rather than 
on the changing opinions that I will focus.  
Highly valuable reconstructions have been made in recent literature of Smith's partially pessimistic 
diagnosis concerning the evolution of modern British society, of his concern with "corruption" or 
with decadence of "virtue," of his partly cyc1ical vision of the history of political institutions, of his 
concern –  even though with partially different conclusions from Hume's –  with the risks of standing 
armies and even more of growing public debt (Salvucci 1966: ch. 1: Pocock 1975: 504-505; Winch 
1978: chs. 4 and 6). An even more important aspect that has been highlighted is his concern about 
the losses implied by civilization: the division of labor carries with it mental mutilation of the 
workers, and a loss of martial virtue and of civic spirit is consequent, The urbanization of growing 
masses carries with it the severing of the links that grant social control over individuals and 
consequently good morals, The damages of the division of labor and of urbanization carry with them 
that splenetic spirit that may favor "enthusiasm" (Cropsey 1957: 96 ff.; Cropsey 1963: 88-93; 
Reisman 1976: 63 ff.; Winch 1978: 97- 99; 113-120). In terms of political doctrines, such 
developments render impossible any recourse to civic spirit, understood in the civic humanist 
tradition: the merchants are the only group able to understand the interests of society, but this 
group is the only one whose interests are contrary to those of the whole (Robertson 1983: 460-465).  
Derived from the above diagnosis is Smith's choice of constitutional engineering, understood as a 
choice of the second best if contrasted with the hope of preserving civic virtue from corruption. The 
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thesis I argue for is that the general framework of the diagnosis and the chosen strategy are 
determined not only by a crude description of "facts," but to a high degree by Smith's theoretical 
premises on unintended results, natural sentiments, self-interest, and passions.  
A second question that may bring us closer to the central question concerns the limits Smith poses 
to political discourse. In its stricter sense (as contrasted with the overall background social theory) 
political discourse has a rather limited scope in comparison with the scope of the seventeenth- 
century Natural Law "politics" or with Rousseau’s "democratic" understanding of politics. Natural 
jurisprudence is primarily concerned with "natural justice," a negative virtue, and when it is 
concerned with "police" it is limited to a strategy of the second best, exactly because the big job is 
done-s-if not in the best way, at least better than any way available to us- by functionalist 
readjustments of the social whole and by historical evolution, The action of the "man of 
government" in the complex commercial society may help solve problems of social integration on 
some of the several levels of this complex society (defense, justice, education) in a highly artificial 
way, very far from an unduly extended laissez faire attitude, but imitating solutions that are already 
naturally offered by the development of commercial society, such as division of labor and market 
mechanisms (Robertson 1984: 469-471). The "legislator," Smith's figure of ideal politician, is very 
different from the mythical figures of founding fathers that enchanted Rousseau: the legislator may 
be inspired by the principle of "utility" to better the institutions of his country, but his leading 
principle must be prudence, understood in very non-Aristotelian terms. The figure of the legislator 
is described in the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in highly Burkean terms: 
 
He may re-establish and improve the constitution, and from the very doubtful and ambiguous character of the leader 
of a party, he may assume the greatest and noblest of all characters, that of the reformer and legislator of a great state; 
and, by the wisdom of his institutions, secure the internal tranquility and happiness of his fellow citizens for many 
succeeding generations . . . though he should consider some of them [the established powers and privileges] as in some 
measure abusive, he will content himself with moderating, what he often cannot annihilate without great violence. 
When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue 
them by force ... and will remedy as well as he can, the inconveniences which may flow from the want of those 
regulations which the people are averse to submit to, When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to 
ameliorate the wrong. (TMS VI.ii.2.14-16)  
 
The biggest danger in politics seems to be the "spirit of system," displayed by reformers who 
produce every kind of unforeseeable result while trying to achieve an abstract rational order (TMS 
VI.ii.2.17).  
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The two preceding points could not be the final proof of any kind of aporia in Smith's system of 
ideas. The hypothesis could be put forth at most of an "elective affinity" between such diagnoses 
and some latent stalemate of Smiths thinking. The third point I shall develop is what I would like to 
name the predicament of nature. While adding a few elements to the general picture of Smith's 
pessimistic attitude, it brings to the fore the latent aporias of his political] thought and reveals how 
they are closely linked with the Galilean break.  
The ultimate regulative criterion carne to Smith from contemplative utilitarianism, the attitude 
suggested by Reason and philosophy, the one that may encourage the pursuit of virtue and wisdom 
in every case in which the uninstructed natural sentiments are not enough. It is important to recall 
that contemplative utilitarianism is not some kind of attitude for Sundays, to be contrasted with an 
empirical survey of actual behaviors, to which we should have recourse on weekdays (as suggested 
by Campbell 1971: 51-52; 219). The "natural sentiments" provide a second and more effective basis 
for normativity, and there is a constant interaction between the first and the second basis, The 
second basis holds to the extent that it is a more or less truthful approximation of the first 
(Cremaschi 1984: ch. 2: Haakonssen 1981: 135-153). Smith's project of a natural jurisprudence is 
precisely the project of a renewed Natural Law free of the main shortcomings of its rationalistic 
versions, primarily the lack of empirical content.  
Within this context the notion of nature to which this natural law refers is different from the 
seventeenth-century notion of nature: a typical feature of the eighteenth-century notion, present 
in Smith, is the opposition between Reason and nature. The eighteenth-century notion of nature 
has long been mocked as lacking in consistency, or it has been considered too vague and too obscure 
to be of any interest to philosophers. What has been overlooked however is the meaningfulness 
this idea recovers when put into the context of the intellectual strategy of eighteenth-century 
philosophers such as Smith (Preti 1957: 37-43). The idea of nature seems necessary for Smith to 
formulate a research program-it is the bridge between two poles, the individual mind and reality-
in-itself, The following discussion will try to show how this research strategy is essential both for 
natural science and for political theory, Within the framework of the project of a weaker Natural 
Law, Smith discovers mechanisms of selection of behaviors useful to the preservation of society 
(Haakonssen 1981: 67-74). It is important to stress that the individual mechanisms do not fit into a 
general functionalist empirical theory of society, but that their discovery helps in the foundation of 
such a normative-empirical discourse as the part on "justice" of natural jurisprudence. A general 
functionalist view of society emerges only at a different level, i.e., of that "dogmatic" pre-
comprehension of social reality offered to the contemplative utilitarian. It is this difference from 
twentieth-century sociology that makes the use of a term such as "proto-functionalism" 
appropriate. It is precisely because "natural justice" is a standard of judgment that needs to be 
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explicated by a "grammar" of justice, i.e., by "natural jurisprudence" (TMS III.6.1l), rather than the 
subject matter of a sociological explanation, that a number of shortcomings cannot be carelessly 
dealt with as mere diagnoses, made by Smith, of what is going on, since they are decisive difficulties 
in which his own system of ideas is caught.  
The difficulties, well known to Smith scholars, are the following. First, the natural sense of justice is 
unavoidably blended with prejudice: the wealthier and more powerful people command our 
sympathy: we feel much more strongly about the smallest inconvenience to ourselves and our 
closest relations than about the biggest disaster that may happen to very distant people; and most 
of all, custom rules to such an extent over OUI natural sentiments that every law and institution that 
is old commands respect regardless of whether it is just (TMS lI.ii.3-4; VI.iL3.6; ry.2.14; Vl.ii.2.11- 
18).  
Second, human rapacity and oppressive inequality are "natural" in a sense that it is difficult to 
distinguish from the sense in which natural sentiments aIe "natural." There is a "natural wish to 
dominate" that belongs among the basic human passions, As a consequence, such institutions as 
slavery still represent, in Smith's eyes, more the norm than the exception (LJ(A) iii.l30; WN III.ii.10; 
IV.vii.b.53-56). 
Third, solutions outlive their usefulness. The most striking case was the survival of infanticide in 
classic societies, when the hardship was over that could have justified such a cruel practice in 
primitive societies (TMS Y.2.14- 16).  
Given the last difficulty, the thesis of the generally beneficial character of the mechanisms of 
selection of appropriate behavior is a scant comfort and can hardly guarantee goodness of our 
unreflected valuations, as it still could for a confident Deist such as 'Smith's teacher Hutcheson, The 
acknowledgment of these difficulties is much more than a description of contradictions existing in 
reality: it constitutes a stalemate of Smiths thinking. The term "nature," in the exertion of providing 
a weaker and non-vacuous basis for normativity, is so twisted that a misplaced circular path arises 
between "natural sentiments" and "the natural course of things." The gap between the ultimate 
order and the Machiavellian “verità effettuale” cannot be solidly filled by our variable and 
corruptible "natural sentiments" (Preti 1957: 171-172).  
To sum up: Smith tries to keep the main idea of Natural Law philosophy, namely the idea of a law 
preceding positive law, while trying to abandon the aprioristic approach of Natural Law 
philosophers, He departs from them, accepting the Galilean break made by Montesquieu, not to 
deduce the right system of law, but rather to reconstruct the genesis of the several systems of law. 
Within the framework provided by this approach, the possibility of a natural law is rescued via 
Hutcheson's and Hume's idea of moral sentiment, The "natural sentiments" of mankind should pave 
a midway between the ideal order of reality of the contemplative utilitarian attitude and the purely 
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factual order of the "natural course of things." Natural sentiments, or natural justice, are the tool in 
a desperate attempt to stop the run from Natural Law to Historicism at some intermediate point. 
The attempt is doomed to failure because what is natural for Smith, in the exertion of gaining 
enough empirical content not to fall back into the nature of rationalistic Natural Law philosophy, 
ends up with appearing as prejudice and whim, as arbitrary as the positive laws it was called forth 
to judge.  
The recognition of some kind of unbridgeable gap between an ever farther off ultimate order and 
the order according to which human beings actually feel and behave would have probably been the 
last word of Smiths unwritten work on natural jurisprudence. 
 
The great judge of the world, has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to interpose, between the weak eye of human 
reason, and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of obscurity and darkness.... If those infinite rewards and 
punishments, which the Almighty has prepared for those who obey or transgress his will, were perceived as distinctly 
as we foresee the frivolous and temporary retaliations which we may expect from one another, the weakness of human 
nature ... could no longer attend to the little affairs of this world; and it is absolutely impossible that the business of 
society could have been carried out, (TMS (2nd ed.) III.2.31).  
 
 
Truth, Virtue, and the Unbridgeable Gap  
It was a long time ago that the seventeenth century was believed to be the age of a self-confident 
and incurably optimistic Enlightenment. The importance of historical pessimism in seventeenth-
century thought is now universally acknowledged (Günther 1984). I would like to establish a link 
between this pessimistic climate of opinion and the topic of the crisis of knowledge recognizable in 
Hume's Treatise and Smith's "History of Astronomy." As for Hume, the suggestion has been made 
that the topic of the crisis of knowledge plays a central role in the Treatise, a role that anticipates 
Husserl's Krisis (Davie 1977: 71). I shall suggest that Smith not only shows the same awareness of 
the crisis of the original promises of the "new science," but also that this awareness is connected 
with the feeling of the crisis of a civilization, to be acknowledged both in the history of science and 
in the history of civil society that has carried along "free governments." The factors felt as conflicting 
in the two fields are, I think, in an important sense analogous. In both domains Smith's thinking is 
under the spell of Cartesian presuppositions that it cannot ful1y overcome. How do these 
presuppositions generate the conflict in the two domains? 
Adam Smith, in his reconstruction of the history of astronomy, concludes that we are irresistibly 
drawn to view the Newtonian system as the discovery of truth concerning reality. This seems to 
stern from an ineluctable tendency of the imagination. The needs of our imagination compel us to 
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take for granted the possibility of theoretical progress, i.e., of a greater "truth" or of closer 
correspondence to reality for each successive theory. They compel us to take for granted that theory 
change is rational, that it does not depend on pure fashion. Strictly speaking, the criteria according 
to which a theory is judged better than another one cannot provide any guarantee regarding its 
truth as adaequatio. The best theory connects the phenomena in a better way (but that implies only 
that it is an ingenious device, not that it reflects reality) or extends a hypothesis from a familiar 
domain to a new one (but that may be merely the result of an arbitrary demand of our imagination, 
and the choice of the hypothesis to be used can depend entirely on custom). 
Smith is consequently forced to state that the only possible conclusion of a critical examination of 
our theories on nature is that even the Newtonian system is an imaginary machine: this imaginary 
machine satisfies to the utmost degree the requirements of the human mind, but that is no 
guarantee that the theory represents the "real chains used by Nature to connect the phenomena." 
The criteria of simplicity, familiarity, coherence, and comprehensiveness are not strictly criteria of 
truth of the theories or criteria of the rationality of theory change. These criteria are, in a sense, 
arbitrary, as they depend on some laws of the mind that have nothing in common with the laws of 
reality.  
The general metaphysical presuppositions of Humean thought, shared by Smith, are the eventual 
reason for this aporetic status of the criteria of truth and of theoretical progress. In the critical 
literature on Hume it is generally accepted that Hume’s main unchallenged presuppositions, which 
determine his skeptical-naturalistic outcome, are basically identical with the presuppositions shared 
by the mainstream of modern thought, and first of all, by Descartes: the presupposed separation of 
res cogitans from res extensa, the absolute distinction between order of ideas and order of reality, 
the atomistic nature of reality and of ideas, and possibly solipsism (N. K. Smith 1941: 559; Dal Pra 
1967: 78-88). The historian of science Adamn Smith, while leaving his "History of Astronomy" 
unfinished, apparently felt –  two centuries before the crisis of the "standard view" –  that it was 
impossible to account for the historical phenomenon "science" as pre-comprehended by our 
culture, so far as the Cartesian presuppositions are accepted, The separation of the order of ideas 
from the order of things and the atomistic nature of phenomena (which makes the individual 
phenomenon unintelligible) are presuppositions that make it impossible to acknowledge any kind 
of rationality in the history of science, or to formulate any idea of the truth of scientific theories that 
makes sense (Bernstein 1983: 51-1(8).  
Let us compare now the crisis of science with the crisis of politics. All the main modern thinkers 
started as defenders of the rights of the individual and ended with a vindication of the rights of the 
collective, of the state, and of realpolitik over the individual. That may be the case for Smith as well: 
the biographical pattern, moving in the direction of an increasingly skeptical and decreasingly 
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whiggish attitude, may serve as a parable for logical developments of ideas, and the inability to write 
the "history and theory of law and government" may be the symptom of a deeply felt trouble, like 
the inability to write a conclusion to the "History of Astronomy." The case of Adam Smith's natural 
jurisprudence may be considered an example of the failure of modern liberal political thought to 
fulfil the task it had assigned himself (Unger 1975: 83-100).  
At the core of the predicament of Smith's political I thought is the contradiction between the need 
he feels to keep a gap between the ultimate order of reality and the weaker order of "natural 
sentiments." and the need to postulate a convergence between the two orders that can be asserted 
only dogmatically. Any of the available solutions to the contradiction would make the self-imposed 
task impossible: it would lead back to rationalistic Natural Law if the gap were filled, or it would 
head toward Historicism, Legal Positivism, and "Political Science" if the mysterious convergence 
between the two orders were wiped out. In no case would natural juris- prudence. or a science of 
the principles upon which civil governments ought to be directed, still be possible. The object of 
modern rationalistic Natural Law, namely a universal basis for rights, could not be provided in non- 
vacuous terms by Rationalism. The opposite attempt, carried out by Smith in sentimentalist terms, 
was unable to provide that basis in universal and necessary terms. 
Smith's attempt was .doomed to failure because of the logical, anthropological, and ontological 
presuppositions he shared with Rationalism: a sharp distinction between essence and phenomena, 
which leaves the gap open between the ultimate order and the actual course of things; atomism, 
which makes the social wholes totally heterogeneous from individuals: an understanding of reason 
in analytic-instrumental terms, which makes practical rationality impossible in principle and leaves 
the natural sentiments in the condition of an empirical fact, called on to fulfil the impossible task of 
providing a basis for normativity.  
It appears that in Smith's system of ideas the main element common to science and politics is the 
"crisis." In both domains the source of the antinomies seems to be the set of basic Cartesian 
presuppositions shared by the mainstream of modern thought. The antinomies cannot be 
adequately explored because of the inability of Smith and of eighteenth-century thought to focus 
on this common background of hidden premises.  
An important part of twentieth-century thought, ranging from the Pragmatist thinkers to the later 
Wittgenstein, to Hermeneutics, and to the Frankfurt School, can be interpreted as a massive critique 
of Cartesianism, Questions of radical redefinition of both scientific and political rationality are on 
the agenda (Bernstein 1983: 16-20). The exploration of one chapter of the vicissitudes of 
Cartesianism in science and in politics may prove useful to the present discussion. 
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The Crisis of Cartesian Reason  
To start with, it can be suggested that there is indeed a link between Smith's political theory and his 
epistemology, The link can be described as a direct influence of the image of the right method –  
presented in "The History of Astronomy," that is, the image of Newtonian natural science, or of what 
seemed to be the best performance of human reason up to Smith's time –  on his theorizing in the 
field of natural jurisprudence. The consequences of this methodological influence are twofold: first, 
Smith fights the "spirit of system," trying to develop a political l theory free from that apriorism 
typical of the theories of Locke, Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf. Second, Smith dismisses a unitary 
(descriptive and normative) order of society and brings in several different coexisting orders: his 
main achievement in this direction is the discovery of the (relatively) autonomous self-regulating 
order of the market. 
A second and more interesting suggestion is based on the answer to a somewhat different question: 
besides the direct link between epistemology and politics, is there some kind of analogical 
relationship between Smith's image of science and his image of politics? Smith's account of science 
is forced to maintain two contradictory views of scientific truth, namely an internal psychological 
criterion, and an external "copy" criterion of truth. In a strikingly similar way, Smith's politics cannot 
give up two contradictory demands, namely the ne ed to appeal to some kind of natural law, 
preceding the several positive laws and based on the natural sentiments of mankind, and the 
acknowledgment that the natural sentiments are not metahistorical and universal, but are 
dependent on social circumstances, on innate tendencies of human imagination, on deeply rooted 
traditions, on ignorance and prejudice. In both fields the human mind is the victim of an 
unavoidable, but at the same time necessary, deception. I think that what happens behind the 
scenes, and is responsible for this similarity, is that Smith is facing one and the same challenge in 
both fields, namely, he is trying to limit the consequences of the acknowledged impossibility to grasp 
the "order of reality" or "reason in itself," as the Rationalists still felt able to do. The substitute Smith 
offers is the postulate of an "order in the mind" as far as the knowledge of nature is concerned and 
the postulate of a reasonable (as contrasted with rational) "order of Nature" as far as social reality 
is concerned. These two orders are somehow of a "weaker" kind, being supposed to portray the 
ultimate order approximately, in a rather mysterious way. It is possible to make sense of this double 
move by Smith only if it is viewed as a way of dealing with the crisis of the solution that Rationalism 
had provided for the tasks or explaining reality and of giving a foundation to norms.  
Here it must be stressed once more –  against all attempts to modernize Smith through a radical 
translation of his theories into contemporary terms –  that the idea of nature is, in this context, 
more essential than ever: it provides a buffer between Reason in reality and Reason in the mind, 
The notion of nature is appealed to in order to fulfil the dual tasks of formulating explanations and 
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of establishing norms. This dependency on the laws of human nature or on the laws of the mind 
seems to confer on our theories on nature something more than a purely instrumental value, and 
to the valuations dictated by natural sentiments a status different from that of mere facts to be 
explained by a sociological theory. 
I have already suggested that the eighteenth-century idea of nature, in order to make sense, needs 
to be appreciated in terms of the intellectual strategies it was called forth to serve. Both in politics 
and in natural science "nature" seems for Smith a possible bridge between two poles, the individual 
mind and the ultimate order of reality, Seventeenth-century Rationalism felt no need for a bridge 
or buffer, as there was an apparent continuity between reason in the individual mind and Reason 
with which reality is informed or that is the essence of reality. The idea of nature, in its typical 
eighteenth-century connotation, is indispensable for Smith to formulate his research program, one 
that might possibly find a third way for natural science between aprioristic essentialism and 
instrumentalism, and a third way for politics between a deductivist Natural Law philosophy and a 
Hobbesian or Mandevillian cynical attitude (Forbes 1977b: 43-44; Preti 1957: 37-43). 
The continuation of the story, after Smith, is well known: in nineteenth-century politics the idea of 
nature was to be replaced by the apparently much more self-evident idea of history or – on the 
opposite front –  an Archimedean point would be sought in a noumenal realm of values, sharply 
contrasted with the empirical realm of facts, In nineteenth-century natural science, a "Humean" 
positivism was to establish itself, resting on skeptical foundations in the theory of knowledge, but 
at the same time able to overlook these foundations while appealing to the undoubted success of 
science in the predictive control of facts, The destinies of science and of politics were to move 
further and further apart as the nice dual seventeenth-century framework (natural philosophy vs. 
moral philosophy) was replaced by an increasingly complex map of knowledge.  
The crisis of reason of the eighteenth century, appearing in a striking way in Hume's Treatise, and 
developed in some of its consequences in Smith's writings, raises a number of questions that 
twentieth-century thought is still trying to answer. This is the crisis of unitary Cartesian Reason. Its 
two aspects, namely the crisis of natural science and the crisis of politics, appear as parallel exactly 
because they are one stage of a run that, starting from the unitary Reason of Rationalism, leads to 
the present proliferation of "reasons." In the culture of the twentieth century, characterized by a 
proliferation of different languages, bodies of knowledge, and practices, each with its own 
epistemological status, it would be hard to find one science to be contrasted with one politics. 
The task still to be carried out, beyond the contributions of the later Wittgenstein, of Pragmatism, 
of Hermeneutics, and of the Frankfurt School, is both highly destructive and creative: it is the task 
of eliminating the last vestiges of Cartesianism that still hinder an adequate self-understanding of 
the markedly differentiated forms of rational practice of our culture (Bernstein 1983: 16-27). Science 
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and politics will appear then as two out of several rational practices, and the problem of the 
relationship between science and politics will be solved, or rather dissolved. 
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